Introduction
Research in the mind sciences often uses cognitive load to distinguish automatic from controlled mental processes. In the past 5 years, more than 1000 journal articles have included the keyword 'cognitive load' (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmed). During that time, experiments using cognitive load tasks (see Glossary) have informed conclusions about the automatic and controlled components of nearly every aspect of human thought and behavior, ranging from visual perception to stereotyping, social comparison, and even juror sentencing decisions [1] . Such experiments have been particularly influential in the domain of social thought and behavior, where they have contributed to debates about human nature, including the automaticity of human prosociality.
A fundamental assumption behind typical cognitive load experiments is that there exists a distinction between two sets of processes in the mind. On such dualprocess accounts of cognition, one set of processes is thought to be relatively fast, automatic, and/or intuitive ('System 1'), whereas another is thought to be relatively slow, controlled, and/or deliberative ('System 2'). In a typical experiment, participants perform a cognitive load task thought to 'occupy' the resources of System 2 (e.g., mental arithmetic, digit string memorization), thereby diminishing the availability of those resources for a concurrent task (Figure 1 ).
Although tremendously influential, the distinction between System 1 and System 2 has attracted increasing scrutiny in recent years [2] [3] [4] . The origins of this scrutiny range from inconsistent results in cognitive load experiments to evidence that a distinction between System 1 and System 2 does not necessarily map onto the functional organization of the brain, leading some commentators to suggest that dual-process theories should be abandoned altogether. Here, I offer a perspective that, first, has the potential to clarify some of the mixed results from cognitive load experiments and, second, offers a way to reinterpret many cognitive load effects without relying on dual-process assumptions.
The DMN
One of the most striking findings in cognitive neuroscience has been the identification of the DMN. The brain regions of the DMN have a distinctive functional profile, characterized by higher activity than other regions of the brain at baseline (i.e., when people are not engaged in a particular task) and deactivations when people direct their attention to a variety of goal-directed tasks [5] . Observed in both humans and nonhuman animals, the DMN has hubs in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and is thought to comprise at least two functional subnetworks [6] .
Although the particular function of the DMN continues to be a topic of intense study, the reliable engagement of this network during self-reflection, inferences about others' mental states, and imagination has spurred an emerging consensus that it supports mental simulation or internally generated thought [6] [7] [8] . In turn, DMN processes are thought to facilitate transcending one's current, first-person perspective in order to plan for the future and navigate the social world.
Glossary
Baseline: typically observed when individuals are 'at rest' (i.e., not occupied with any particular task), the baseline is the state of activity in the brain in the absence of activation [5] . Activations are characterized by greater increases in oxygen supply than oxygen consumption, as reflected in changes to the oxygen extraction fraction (OEF) on positron emission tomography (PET) and the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal on fMRI. Brain regions in the DMN have high baseline activity. This high activity is not thought to constitute an activation because the OEF is uniform across the DMN and other regions when individuals are at rest. Cognitive load task: typically, a task in which individuals hold in mind strings of numbers (or other items), perform mental arithmetic, or monitor a computer screen for the appearance of a particular number or letter. These tasks are thought to demand attention and/or working memory resources and typically involve numerical processing. Deactivation: a reduction in the activity of a brain region (or regions) relative to the baseline state. On PET, deactivations are reflected in an increase in the OEF. On fMRI, deactivations are reflected in a reduction in the BOLD signal. Brain regions in the DMN deactivate during typical cognitive load tasks. Default mode network (DMN): a network of brain regions in which activity is higher than other parts of the brain at baseline. This network has hub regions in the MPFC and PCC. Regions in the DMN tend to be activated when participants introspect, think about the minds of other people, remember the past, and envision the future. These regions deactivate during typical cognitive load tasks. In adults, the DMN is distinguished from other functional brain networks, including a frontoparietal network associated with attention and control and a salience network hypothesized to mediate the relationship between the DMN and frontoparietal networks. System 1: a hypothesized set of processes in the mind that are fast, automatic, unconscious, and/or intuitive. System 2: a hypothesized set of processes in the mind that are slow, controlled, conscious, and/or deliberative. These processes are sometimes referred to as 'executive' processes. The impetus behind this Forum is the observation that the tasks now known to deactivate the DMN are the tasks typically used in cognitive load experiments. Performing mental arithmetic, remembering a string of numbers, and pressing a button when a particular letter appears are all associated with DMN deactivations [9] . This observation raises the possibility that typical cognitive load tasks might inhibit processes of self-reflection, mental state attribution, or imagination with which the DMN is associated, suggesting that we rethink the interpretation of studies using those tasks.
Reinterpreting Cognitive Load Experiments in Light of DMN Deactivations
Two recent examples illustrate how the DMN perspective can offer reinterpretations of cognitive load results. In one study, cognitive load disrupted tracking of others' beliefs, leading the authors to conclude that belief tracking is not fully automatic [10] . In another study, cognitive load reduced empathy, leading the authors conclude that empathy is not fully automatic [11] . In both cases, the apparent disruption of a social cognitive function by a cognitive load task was interpreted as evidence that the function requires contributions from System 2. However, the DMN perspective suggests an alternative interpretation: cognitive load tasks could have disrupted belief tracking and empathy by inhibiting activity in brain regions associated with mental state attribution.
These brief examples highlight the difficulty of drawing conclusions about the automaticity of social cognitive functions on the basis of cognitive load experiments, given that typical cognitive load tasks do not merely 'occupy System 2' (if such a system exists) but also deactivate brain regions associated with social cognition. Additionally, they illustrate how a DMN perspective can translate the results of experiments conceived on a dual-process framework into interpretations that do not depend on that framework's validity.
Can DMN Deactivations Disrupt Social Cognition?
The tendency of the DMN to deactivate during typical cognitive load tasks raises the possibility that at least some effects in cognitive load studies could be due to disruptions in the cognitive processes associated with the DMN. An important question is whether reductions in DMN activity can actually disrupt the cognitive processes with which the network is associated. More work is needed, but recent findings suggest that the answer could be yes. For example, in an fMRI experiment, spontaneous fluctuations in DMN activity were associated with the speed of mental state (but not physical) judgments of others on a trial-by-trial basis [12] . Tentatively, this suggests that even incidental decreases 
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Concluding Remarks
The DMN perspective cautions against an overly simplistic view of cognitive load. Independent of possible effects on attention, working memory, or deliberative processes, typical cognitive load tasks could also affect cognition via their inhibitory effects on the DMN. Interpretations of cognitive load effects on social and decision-making tasks are especially complicated by the possibility that these effects could arise from disruptions of social cognition, self-reflection, and/or imagination -a possibility that is open to direct empirical test in future research. At the same time, this perspective is not ultimately yoked to any particular assumptions about the cognitive processes associated with the DMN. The central point is a more abstract one: typical cognitive load tasks deactivate certain brain regions, so whatever those regions contribute to cognition might be disrupted by typical cognitive load tasks.
The DMN perspective offers one alternative way to understand findings previously understood on a dual-process framework. However, these interpretations are not mutually exclusive. In theory, a cognitive load manipulation could simultaneously reduce the availability of attentional or working memory resources for a given task and diminish the contribution of social cognitive processes to that task. This observation could help to reconcile mixed results from past experiments.
Ultimately, this perspective reflects a wider scientific effort to understand the organization of the processes that constitute the human mind [4] . Its reinterpretation of past studies illustrates how a focus on functional brain networks could help to release cognitive theory from dual-process frameworks and highlights one way in which neuroscience can inform theories about human cognition.
